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SWEDEN AND NORDIC BALANCE

COLONEL ALBERT LEO ROMANESKI, USA

exerted largely by its national vigor, by its
example of social and industrial progress, by
its contributions to humanitarian causes, by
its activist participation in international
organizations, and by its military involvement
i11 the peacekeeping operations of the United
Nations.
Modern Sweden occupies a central position
at thc head of the Baltic, on NATO's northern
flank. Except for the Finnish crisis of 1961,
when the Soviet Union threatened to invoke
t h e c o n s u l t a t i o n provisions of the
Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance Treaty as a
counteraction to growing West German
strength in the Baltic, relative quiet has
generally prevailed.
The northern calm and stability stand in
sharp contrast with the events of the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a , where rccunent
inflammatory events focus the attention of
planners, and policy and decision makers on
the threats to NATO's southern flank. The
b u i l d u p of the Soviet Navy in the
Mediterranean, the increasing Soviet influence
in the Arab states because of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the problems of base rights in Franco
Spain, and grant aid support for the military
dictatorship in Greece are but a few examples
of major Mediterranean problems.
Although less volatile, the Baltic and the
Scandinavian peninsula are in many respects
significant to western defense. There are some
who contend that the buildup of the Soviet
Navy and Merchant Marine in the Baltic is
occurring simultaneously with a parallel
expansion in the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean. These observers see the Soviet
naval threat to Western Europe as naval
pincers, with the southern arm through the
Mediterranean and the northern arm through
the Baltic.
Sweden, an armed neutral, provides a
military and political balance between NATO
Norway and Denmark, and non-aligned

(Editor's Note: The views expressed in this
article are those o f the author and d o n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y reflect the views o f the
Department o f Defense or its agencies.)

(How can a non-aligned country
contribute to the military and political
balance between the great power blocs in
its own region?)

Sweden's role as a great world power ended
when Karl XII was defeated at the Battle of
Poltava in the Ukraine in 1709. The Baltic
provinces had to be ceded to Russia, and
Peter the Great moved his capital from
Moscow to St. Petersburg (now Leningrad).
Russia thus arose as a major power on the
Baltic, envisioning then as now that the Baltic
provided access to Europe and a natural
outlet for the Russian Empire t o the west.1
Although relegated to the status of a third
rate power, Sweden has continued to a
surprising degree, to influence world events in
the Twentieth Century. This influence is
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Finland, which lies under close Soviet
scrutiny. The Scandinavian states thwart
direct Soviet access through the narrow exits
of the Baltic, and they lie directly beneath the
shortest air and missile route between Soviet
a n d N o r t h American population and
industrial centers.
An analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces
emphasizes the degree to which Sweden
contributes to the delicate balance in the
Scandinavian region. The power equation of
Scandinavia, generally termed Nordic Balance,
minimizes the amount of resources that
NATO nations must devote to the region's
security. Similarly, the goals of the Soviet
Union seem to favor a neutral, non-nuclear
Scandinavia which does not seriously threaten
Soviet access to the Atlantic through the
Baltic straits.2 Because Denmark and Norway
are NATO countries, a non-aligned Sweden is
essential to Soviet security.
GEOGRAPHY

Sweden is an oblong shaped country with
the third largest area in Europe and the
longest coastline (4,738 miles). If a pin were
placed on a map at Sweden's southern tip,
and the entire country rotated around this
pivot, Sweden's northernmost part would
scribe an arc below Naples, Italy.
Sweden presents an eastern front across the
Baltic and, with Finland, along a northern
border that is longer than NATO's entire
central front in Europe.
Most of the population of almost eight
million live in the southern third of the
c o u n t r y , w h i c h is industrially and
agriculturally the most prosperous portion of
the land. In the south, Denmark and Sweden
control the Baltic approaches which are so
important to Soviet European merchant
shipping and which constitute a major access
route for Soviet naval forces to the Atlantic.
In the north, Sweden shares a land border
with Finland, and Swedish Lapland lies
astride the most accessible route through
Finland to the largely ice-free port of Nanrik,
Norway. The rail line t o Narvik passes
through ICiruna, the center of the extensive
iron ore deposits. The Kiruna mines provide
one of Sweden's most important exports.

Sweden shares a long and peaceful border
with its Norwegian neighbor. Until 1905
Norway formed a federation with Sweden,
and there is generally a cultural, religious,
language a n d social similarity among
Norwegians and Swedes.
ECONOMY

By and large Sweden's economy is
industrialized, with full employment as one of
the basic tenets of the Social Democratic
Government. Popular American opinion to
the contrary, private enterprise owns and
operates 90 percent of Swedish industry, the
State only 6 percent, mostly public utilities,
and public cooperatives the remaining 4
percent.
A GNP of over $28 billion gives Sweden
one of the highest standards of living in the
world, with a per capita GNP well over
$3000. The projected annual growth of GNP
through the 1970's is based largely on foreign
trade. West Germany and Great Britain are
Sweden's two chief trading partners. About
one-fourth of Sweden's industrial production
is exported, primarily to EFTA 3 and EEC4
countries, with exports to the United States
averaging about 6 percent of the total.
Imports follow the same pattern, with
imports from the United States usually
averaging about 10 percent of the totaL5
About 5 percent of Sweden's foreign trade is
w i t h t h e Eastern European countries,
including the Soviet Union.
Trade unions and employers' organizations
are centralized in Sweden, with central wage
negotiations every two years. For more than
thirty years Sweden has enjoyed a remarkable
industrial peace, which has contributed
significantly to increasing production. The
number of days lost annually due t o labor
disputes per 1,000 population tends to vary in
Sweden between .3 and 6.6, as compared t o
80 to more than 100 in the United
ICingdom.6
The Swedish Federation of Labor (LO) has
taken a statesmanlike view of labor relations.
By educating its membership, LO has led the
field in movements to rationalize Swedish
industry. Where Swedish workers have lost
jobs to mechanization, LO has urged the
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government and the National Labor Market
Board to encourage the establishment of
other plants to offset the impact of
transitional ~ n e m p l o y m e n t . ~
Sweden is a member of European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) and belongs also to
the Nordic Council, a political forum among
the Scandinavian countries. Sweden, like
Great Britain, is interested in an economic
association with the European Economic
Community (EEC) provided that association
would not involve changes in Sweden's
tradition of political non-alignment. Within
the framework of the Nordic Council, Sweden
has explored the formation of an economic
union with Denmark, Norway and Finland.
However, t h i s regional union, called
"NORDEK," was vetoed by Finland in the
summer of 1970.8 Great Britain's entrance
into EEC would pressure the Swedes to
accommodate themselves to the resulting
economic situation. If modified membership
in EEC proved impossible for the Swedes,
they would probably take the initiative in
trying to conclude a NORDEK type of
economic community within Scandinavia.
About 16 percent of the Swedish national
budget goes for defense. Sweden's defense
industries are quite sizable, and although the
Swedish Armed Forces are the paramount
customer, arms exports make possible longer,
more economic production runs. NORDEK
would provide a market for arms as well as
other goods.
Early in 1970, the Swedes concluded an
agreement with Finland t o deliver twelve J-35
Draken jet fighters for $49 mil1ion.g In many
cases the Swedish requirement is so limited
that the country must look to the West,
primarily to Great Britain, France, and the
United States as sources from which to buy
m i l i t a r y hardware.10 Alternatively, if
production is started on a major weapons
system, the Swedes must seek external
markets for arms, just as they must export
other manufactured goods t o maintain a
healthful economy.
With internal problems of inflation and
increased taxation and a balance of payments
deficit, the pressure to export arms will
increase. In some cases, such as in Finland,

Swedish arms are acceptable and even
preferable substitutes for Soviet systems.
Finland could hardly expect Soviet approval
to buy U.S. systems nor those produced in
other NATO countries, whereas Swedish arms
might win Soviet approval.
POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Sweden last engaged in a war in 1814. This
confrontation with Denmark at the end of the
Napoleonic era pitted the Swedish Crown
Prince Karl Johan, alias Jean Baptiste
Bernadotte, a former Marshal of France,
against Napoleon's ally. Bernadotte won a
decisive victory over the Danes in Holstein;
and in the Treaty of Kiel in January 1814,
Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden. The
Norwegians finally swore allegiance to
Bernadotte under military pressure and
r e m a i n e d u n i t e d with Sweden until
September 1905, when The Act of Union of
1814 became void as the result of a
Norwegian plebiscite.
The first Bernadotte King, Karl XIV Johan,
ascended to the Swedish throne in 1818.
Having served a successfully martial
apprenticeship as Crown Prince, he instituted
a period of peace which has lasted until the
present day. Under Bernadotte's rule,
Sweden's first and fundamental principle of
foreign policy became, and still remains,
non-alignment in peace aimed at neutrality in
war. This policy is not without difficulty, and
Sweden mobilized its armed forces on several
occasions, including in this century during
both World Wars; however, by clever
diplomacy linked with adroit opportunism,
the Swedes remained non-belligerent.
During World War 11, Swedish policy
d e v i a t e d f r o m strict neutrality. The
fundamental aim was to stay out of the war at
all costs.11 Although sympathetic to the
Finns in the Russo-Finnish conflict during the
Winter War of 1939-40, Sweden would not
permit a British-French force to cross its
territory to come to the aid of the valiant but
sorely outnumbered Finnish forces.
After the German occupation of Norway
and Denmark, Sweden permitted unarmed
German troops on leave to traverse its
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territory enroute back and forth to Norway.
Germany was also permitted to send combat
troops (one combat division) from Norway
across Sweden to support Finland in 1941, a
blatant violation of neutrality. Later in the
war, as the tide of battle turned against the
Germans, the Swedes moved to cancel
German transit privileges and cooperate more
openly with the Allies, especially Denmark
and Norway.1 2 2
T h e non-alignment foreign policy is
accepted by all political parties without
debate. There is also general acceptance that
non-alignment requires a certain credible
defense establishment. Questions concerning
defense usually involve priorities and budget
levels rather than fundamental changes in the
national goal of maintaining credible defense
forces.
The Social Democratic Party has ruled in
Sweden for 3 8 years. The opposition
bourgeois parties-the Conservative Party,
Center Party, and Liberal Party--are unable t o
field enough popular support and able
p o l i t i c i a n s to challenge seriously the
predominant Social Democrats. The real
political action transpires within the Social
D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y s t r u c t u r e , which
encompasses ultra-liberal, New Left elements
as well as a conservative faction a t the
extreme ends of the spectrum, with all
gradations of political shadings between.
On 20 September 1970, the Swedes held
their first national election for the new 350
seat unicameral legislature. l3 The Social
Democrats lost votes to the Center Party and
also to the Communists, who succeeded in
raising their number of seats from three in the
old Lower House to 17 in the new Parliament.
Although the Social Democrats lost the
absolute majority attained in the 1968 gencral
election, they are with 162 seats still by far
the most powerful single party, with the
Center Party running a poor second with 71
seats. As during the period from 1957 to
1968, the Social Democrats should be able to
retain control, even though they have nine
less seats than the combined bourgeois
opposition (162 versus 17 1). The election
results are summarized below. $ 4

Party
Social Democratic
Conservative
Center
Liberal
Communist
Total

Number of
Seats
1968 Election
(Lower House)

Number of
Seats
1970 Election

125
32
39
34

162
42
71

3

17
350

233
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It is significant to note that Olof Palme, the
44-year old Prime Minister, has managed to
stay in office during this first real test of his
political power. Lacking the popularity and
homespun appeal of Tage Erlander, who
retired in October 1969 after a a 23-year term
as Prime Minister, Palme believes that the
government's authority has been weakened
"very little" by the election outcome, l 5 ` but
the fact is that without a Social Democratic
majority he must at least consider the
Bourgeois Party positions more fully than in
the old bi-camera1 parliament.
Criticism of United States foreign policy,
particularly in Vietnam, appears to be a tactic
employed by the Social Democrats t o divert
attention from pressing domestic problems
such as lack of adequate urban housing and
rising inflation. Although the Swedish
Government recognizes both the Hanoi and
Peking regimes, the general orientation of the
Swedish people is culturally, historically, and
actually toward the West.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

One of the great strengths of this small
country is the vigor, intelligence, and aptitude
of its scientific community. The government
encourages travel for the country's scientists,
who participate regularly in important
s c i e n t i f i c m e e t i n g s a n d symposiums
throughout the world.
In the military field, Swedish technology
finds application in a surprisingly apt and
ambitious military research and development
program. The Swedes have a heavy water
atomic energy program which militarily keeps
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The famous turettless Swedish S-Tank, manufactured by Bofors, mounts a 105mm high velocity gun.
The vehicle in the background is the Pbv 302 Armored Personnel Carrier.

the nuclear option open to them, although
the political decision about developing a
Swedish nuclear weapon has been deferred
indefinitely.
Military research is centered in the
Research Institute of Swedish National
Defense (FOA). This organization has four
main divisions: FOA-1 for chemistry and
physics; FOA-2 for electronics and ballistic
physics; FOA-3 for guidance, acoustics, and
electronic countermeasures; FOA-4 for
nuclear research. The Defense Materiel
Administration of the Armed Forces (FMV) is
the primary development agency with Army,
N a v y , a n d Air F o r c e Departments.
Cooperation among FOA and FMV is well
coordinated and continuous.
Swedish industry manufactures most of the
aircraft, vehicles, ships, and weapons systems
in use by the Swedish armed forces. These
major weapons systems include aircraft, ships,
tanks, missiles, trucks, artillery, electronic and
communication equipment, explosives, and
sinall arms of all types. Bofors, SAAB, and
the National Defense Factories (FFV) are

well-known exporters of arms throughout the
western world.
SOCIAL FACTORS

Sweden is an advanced social welfare state
which applies the principle of universality
rather than need in social programs. For
example, all children receive a free school
lunch, not just the needy. Everyone qualifies
for free medical care, not just those who
cannot afford it. Almost one-third of the
national budget is devoted to social services
and social welfare programs. The mortality
rate among infants is one of the lowest in the
world and the average life expectancy is
among the world's longest.
T h e S w e d i s h population is almost
homogeneous. More than 98 percent of the
population belong to the Lutheran State
Church. Minority groups of Lapps, Gypsies,
and Southern Europeans (the last group
imported to fill the labor market shortage) are
very small and fairly dispersed. In other
w o r d s , the language, religion, culture,
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customs, attitudes, and values of most Swedes
support a society in which there are very few
dissident elements. This lack of diversity is a
source of national strength. The population
nears 100 percent literacy and tends to be
rational, deliberate, honest, non-violent and
somewhat passive.
SWEDISH DEFENSE STRATEGY

Swedish military doctrine, termed "Total
Defense," includes the armed forces, civil
defense, economic defense, and psychological
defense. The Swedish King Gustav VI Adolf
has stated, "The foremost purpose of Total
Defense is to be so well prepared for war that
our preparedness will deter aggression. . . .
T h e various parts of Total Defense interact
together so that the highest possible
effectiveness is reached."16
Sweden's basic military strategy is to deter
an attack by providing armed forces that
would inflict severe losses on any aggressor. In
the event of an attack, the strategy is to repel
the invader from Swedish soil. The Swedes
have no regional defense commitments, not
even among their Scandinavian neighbors; and
the national goal is to avoid war a t almost any
price.
During World War II when German strength
was a threat to Swedish security, Sweden
permitted the Nazi's to transport men and
materials on the Swedish railway system. As
the pendulum swung in favor of the Allies,
this privilege was withdrawn.
After the war, Sweden, in one of its least
glorious moments, acceded to Soviet demands
for the return to Soviet control of hundreds
of Baltic States refugees against their will to
uncertain fates within the Soviet Union.17
The obvious historical lesson is that Sweden
will accommodate to political pressure as
necessary to avoid military involvement unless
an aggressor actually attacks Swedish
territory.
Sweden lacks the natural resources for any
sort of protracted conflict and relies in fact
on the US/NATO nuclear umbrella, although
this reliance is neither stated nor admitted by
Swedes. The Soviet Union presents the only
military threat to Swedish security, and the

Swedish strategy includes keeping Finland
independent from increased Soviet influence.
The Swedish strategic argument concerning
Finland develops along the following theme.
If Sweden became more closely oriented
militarily with NATO, even with Denmark
and Norway, the Soviet Union would have the
justification necessary to invoke the Mutual
Assistance Treaty by requiring closer military
cooperation from the Finns. Russo-Finnish
collaboration would poise Soviet forces on
the Swedish border in the north, eliminating
the warning time that the Swedes require for
mobilization. This consideration alone makes
Swedish membership in NATO a strategic as
well as a political impossibility.
STRUCTURE

The Swedish Armed Forces consist of an
Army, Navy and Air Force. Within the Navy
there is also a Coast Artillery somewhat
similar in mission to the American Marine
Corps. The services train and equip forces for
the six unified commands into which the
country has been divided since 1966.
The military structure is founded on a
rapid mobilization system based on universal
military service for all male citizens over 18
years of age. The peacetime organization is a
training establishment managed by the chiefs
of service. In the wartime organization, the
training centers disappear and the mobilized
war units become subordinate to the unified
commanders, who report through the Defense
Staff to the Supreme Commander. This
organization is depicted on page 6
The six unified commands are fully staffed
and operative during peacetime and are
responsible both for planning in their
geographic areas of responsibility and for the
exercise scenarios of reserve units recalled to
periodic active duty. These active duty cycles,
together with the conscript's large unit
training at the end of the initial training
period, afford peacetime practice for the
unified commands. The exercise scenarios
involve actual execution of defense plans over
the terrain that the mobilization unit will
defend in wartime.
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The Swedish 5-3 Draken, built by SAAB, is the mainstay of the Swedish Air Force.
ARMY

S o m e Swedish Regiments trace an
unbroken history to the 1530's and the time
of Gustavus Vasa, the grandfather of Gustavus
II Adolphus, Sweden's most famous Soldier
King. When a conscript begins his training he
is assigned to a regiment. He becomes familiar
with its traditions and history, and generally
remains a member of the same regiment
throughout his period of reserve obligation.
The regimental system helps to instill esprit in
the new recruit. The regiments, although rich
in tradition, no longer become field units in
wartime. They are peacetime training centers
for infantry, armor, artillery, signal, engineer
and support battalions which form the
building blocks of the wartime brigades. They
also serve as centers for the direction and
control of mobilization of wartime brigades,
which are the basic self-sustaining ground
elements during war. Brigades may, however,
be grouped under division-type control
headquarters as the situation may require.
Of the 50,000 annual conscripts, about
36,500 go to the Army. The regular Army
consists of about 11,000 officers and
non-commissioned officers, whose peacetime
purpose is to man the defense and army staffs
and the training cadre for the regimental
training centers. Although the Swedish
Army's wartime organization is classified, the

analysis provided by the Institute of Strategic
Studies in London leads to a wartime strength
estimate of about 30 infantry brigades and 10
armor brigades with supporting logistical
units. The aggregate mobilized strength of the
entire Swedish Army would be about 750,000
men and women.18
AIR FORCE

The Swedish Air Force, the fifth largest
and one of the most modern in the world, is
composed of more than 1200 aircraft,
including 720 combat aircraft, mostly of
Swedish design and manufacture. The first
line of Swedish defenses, the Air Force
provides the umbrella under which the
planned mobilization of the armed forces can
be accomplished. A substantial number of
Swedish planes are constantly airborne on
patrol over the Baltic, and another segment is
maintained on ready alert.
T h e A i r F o r c e also depends on
mobilization, but to a lesser extent than the
Army. Most of its regular active duty
personnel are pilots, and the reaction time for
the Swedish Air Force is quite rapid-a matter
of a few minutes as opposed to a few days for
the Army and Navy.
The newest Swedish aircraft, the SAAB
A-37 Viggen, is a high performance Mach 2
aircraft with a STOL capability t o allow it to

62

operate from Sweden's numerous reserve
airfields which afford dispersion during war.
The mainstay of the Swedish Air Force is
another SAAB aircraft, the J-35 Draken,
while the older S-32 provides the Swedish
inventory with a jet reconnaissance capability.
Propeller driven aircraft include C-130
Hercules, the older DC-3, British Pembrokes,
and the Swedish built SK 50 SAAB Safir. A
recent addition is the Beagle lightplane which
is used for training and also as a platform for
the Bofors anti-tank Bantam missile in close
support of the Army. This aircraft is
manufactured in England.

RESERVE

All Swedish males a t age 18 become eligible
for military service. The basic period of
training is for about 10 months, except for
those conscripts selected for specialist,
non-commissioned officer, and officer
training. This initial period is followed by
regular periods of refresher training with the
reservist's wartime unit, affording him the
opportunity to draw his equipment a t his
mobilization point and immediately join his
unit as he would in wartime.
The reserve obligation extends until age 47,
when the reservist may voluntarily join the
Home Guard, which provides lightly armed
security forces to secure the Swedish
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , such as factories,
communications, and key road intersections,
while main force units mobilize. The Home
Guard also provides some security against
surprise raiding operations against Swedish
communications.
There are several thousand mobilization
points throughout Sweden where equipment,
weapons, and ammunition are prepositioned.
Each reservist carries with him detailed
mobilization orders. Total mobilization would
paralyze the nation's normal economy and is
not rehearsed in peacetime, so that there is n o
verification of the Swedish claim that
750,000 men can be mobilized within 7 2
hours. However, the Swedes themselves are

NAVY

The Swedish Navy is divided into two
parts: the Fleet and the Coast Artillery. The
Navy is primarily equipped with destroyers,
motor torpedo boats, auxiliaries, mine layers,
mine sweepers, and submarines, as well as an
anti-submarine warfare air arm. Many of the
bases for Swedish ships are underground caves
hewn from the granite of the Swedish coast.
The Coast Artillery provides an amphibious
defense anchored in the thousands of islands
in the Baltic approaches to the Swedish
mainland. Prepositioned mines and firing
positions are designed to slow an aggressor's
amphibious assault. The Coast Artillery
operates from naval vessels, navy helicopters,
and also from its own amphibious craft.

S W E D I S H EMBASSY. WASHINGTON. D.C,

The destroyer, Smaland, plows the Baltic on patrol.
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confident that the system will work. They
point to the success of piecemeal rehearsals
and also to the success of the Israeli
mobilization in the June 1967 war, since the
Israeli mobilization system is quite similar to
the Swedish.
The reserve forces are augmented by a
number of voluntary military organizations.
In addition to the Home Guard, these include
women's auxilaries for cooking, driving, and
other services; civil defense; Red Cross;
shooting clubs; and functional associations for
improving professional knowledge. The long
list o f S w e d i s h v o l u n t a r y defense
organizations serves to underline the interest
of the Swedish people in Total Defense. Their
total membership exceeds one million.
CONCLUSION

Sweden's geographical position between
NATO Norway and Finland overshadowed by
the Soviet Union provides a balance on
NATO's northern flank. This balance depends
on a continuation of Sweden's non-alignment
policy and the maintenance of modern armed
forces sufficiently strong to make defense of
Sweden credible.
Since Sweden's only security threat is the

Soviet Union, it might appear to be in
Sweden's interest t o join the Western
Alliance. However, Swedish participation in
NATO could cause the Soviet Union either to
occupy Finland or demand military bases
within Finland. Finnish bases would extend
S o v i e t over - the- pole offensive missile
capabilities and early warning air defenses.
Such bases would not only increase the threat
to Sweden but also to Norway and NATO.
It is in best interests of the Western Alliance
and the United States to support Sweden's
role of Nordic Balance, primarily because the
contribution of non-aligned Sweden to the
security of the Scandinavian peninsula
permits NATO a certain economy of
resources in the Scandinavian region.
Although Swedish industry has an excellent
c a p a b i l i t y f o r t h e m a n u f a c t u r e of
conventional weapons of a wide variety, the
relatively short production runs of certain
items make them uneconomical. Whenever
possible, NATO countries should sell to
Sweden the war material that Swedes seek to
buy off-shore in order to maintain their
military strength. Similarly, the Allies should
maintain a liberal policy toward the sale of
Swedish weapons t o other non-communist
nations.
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The six recently constructed SPICA-class torpedoboats displace 200 tons and have gas turbine engines.
Their armament includes one 57 mm (2.5 inches) Bofors gun and six 53 cm (21 inches) torpedo tubes.
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The Pbv 302 Armored Personnel Carrier mounting a 20 mm cannon provides mobility to mechanized infantry.
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